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This work evaluates policy recommendations on medical error reporting systems presented in, To  err 
is human, a report published by the Institute of Medicine. Here mandatory reporting should be 
applied for adverse events, while voluntary reporting is recommended for near misses. This analysis 
shows that an error reporting scheme of this type is not an optimal one since both near misses and 
adverse events may remain unreported. This work makes evident that penalising health care decision 
makers for not reporting errors, independent of error category, is crucial for reaching the first-best 




The Institute of Medicine report (IOM, 2000) on the quality of health care drew considerable attention 
and awakened the interest in medical error prevention. The report recommended a national goal of 
reducing the number of medical errors by 50 percent over 5 years.
1 To that end, IOM outlined an 
approach that included actions to; i) enhance the knowledge base about safety, ii) raise standards for 
improvements in safety through the actions of oversight organisations, and iii) identify and learn from 
medical errors through both mandatory and voluntary reporting systems.
2 The IOM report is part of a 
new perspective on error prevention (the new patient safety movement) that recommends disclosure, 
openness and transparency and questions the adequacy of current malpractice systems (Studdert et al. 
2004, Sage, 2003, Bovbjerg et al 2001).
3 Information on medical errors is considered valuable since 
regulatory bodies and health-care institutions themselves could systematically report, register and 
analyse such data and translate them into useful information to reduce the future frequency and 
severity of errors.
4 National databases are perceived particularly useful in their ability to detect 
unusual events and identify emerging problems.
5 The value of information is not associated with 
adverse events, only, but also near misses. Knowledge about near misses is useful for predicting future 
adverse events and providing regulators with the opportunity to respond to them to avoid such costly 
events. DH (2000) perceives near misses as free lessons. 
  The emphasis on learning benefits together with the current underreporting of medical errors 
has led to a discussion of the adequacy of reporting systems.
6 Reporting systems vary in scope, in type 
                                                           
1 The IOM report is also discussed in Brennan et al., (2000).  
2 The recommendations were later evaluated by the Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force (QuIC) that 
fully endorsed the IOM’s call for action and developed a strategy that builds on their recommendations and in 
some cases goes beyond them (QuIC, 2000).  
3 A wide range of fundamental policy reforms to malpractice systems are suggested including new mechanisms 
for solving disputes, no-fault systems, change in legal liability and a call for more system-orientated approaches 
(Studdert and Brennan, 2001). 
4 By medical error is meant an injury or illness caused by medical management rather than by the underlying 
disease or condition of the patient (adverse event) or an event that could have resulted in an injury or illness 
(near miss). 
5 See e.g. the special issue of the British Medical Journal (320; 2000), DH (2000) and Runciman and Moller 
(2001) for more on the value of error information.  
6 Cullen et al., (1995) finds, for example, that errors are underreported by a factor of 10. Barach and Small 
(2000) refers to literature for which the estimated underreporting of adverse events range between 50%-96%.    5
of information collected, how information is analysed, in confidentiality provisions, and how feedback 
to reporters is fashioned.
7 IOM (2000) defines mandatory reporting as systems that hold providers 
accountable for their performance, while voluntary reporting focuses on patient safety improvement by 
the provision of information. Mandatory reporting programs are operated by state regulatory programs 
that have the authority to investigate specific cases and to issue penalties and fines for wrong-doing. 
According to IOM these systems; i) provide the public with a minimum level of protection due to 
investigations and follow-up actions, ii) provide incentives to improve patient safety and, iii) require 
all organisations to make some level of investments in patient safety. Voluntary reporting programs 
identify errors and remedy vulnerabilities in systems before the occurrences of harm and there are no 
penalties observed around specific cases.
8  
  IOM (2000) identifies a need both for mandatory and voluntary reporting systems in 
connection with medical errors and recommends a reporting hierarchy sorting errors into two 
categories; i) errors that result in serious injury or death (adverse events) and ii) lesser injuries or 
noninjurius events (near misses). Mandatory reporting systems should be applied for serious adverse 
events (involve liability), while near misses should be subject to voluntary reporting.
9,10 Hence, a 
system for which medical errors are treated differently conditioned upon the category of error is 
proposed.
11,12 The IOM proposal raises some interesting questions as concerns optimal incentives in 
health care.
13 Reporting incentives and the value of learning are perspectives that have been ignored in 
the health economic literature. In this paper an evaluation of the IOM incentive system is undertaken. 
                                                           
7 Reporting systems suffer from underreporting and the degree is believed to depend on factors such as; whether 
the programme is mandatory or voluntary, confidentiality or not, reporter perceptions, and the degree of 
feedback provided to reporters. 
8 IOM identifies legal constraints on protecting data submitted to voluntary reporting systems since health care 
organisations are concerned that sharing information about errors will expose them to litigation. 
9 The same recommendations are endorsed by QuIC (2000). DH (2000) recommends a mandatory reporting 
scheme for adverse events and specified near misses, while Cohen (2000) and IMSP (1999) favour voluntary 
reporting systems.  
10 A possible explanation for the distinction between the two error categories is that adverse events are easier to 
identify and harder to conceal. Public disclosure combined with investigations and the possibility of being held 
accountable is believed to induce physicians to lie low given the occurrence of near misses. 
11 However, it is somewhat unclear whether IOM, by mandatory reporting, allows for the possibility to penalise 
decision-makers for failing to report (see also section 3). 
12 Such a system is not obvious from a judicial point of view since the question of liability or wrong-doing need 
not be correlated with the degree of patient injury. Brennan et al., (1996) find that the primary determinant of 
whether an injury will receive compensation is the extent of injury, not the extent of fault. 
13 IOM (2000) does not discuss how the policy proposal relates to current malpractice systems.     6
This is done by applying an analytical model, where incentives, both to prevent errors from occurring 
(deterrence) and to report about such incidents once they occur, are studied. An important feature of 
the model is that the occurrence of medical errors and their category (adverse events and near miss) is 
private information to health care workers. The model is one with moral hazard, risk neutral agents, 
and a noisy negligence rule.
14 Only efficiency issues are considered which implies that distributive 
(patient compensation) considerations are ignored.
15 The paper is organised as follows. In section 1, a 
general model is presented for which penalties are conditioned on the category of error and a first-best 
penalty scheme is derived. Section 2 analyses the IOM policy proposal. The last section concludes.   
 
1.  A model of error prevention and learning.      
The analysis concerns the relationship between a regulator and health care workers. The model 
borrows from the literature on hidden information and mechanism design formerly applied to analyse 
tax reporting incentives and environmental compliance (see Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and the 
references therein).
16 The regulator is concerned both with accountability (deterrence) and 
informational gains. The physician is exposed to the risk of committing medical errors and undertakes 
a two-step decision process.
17 First, they decide on how much to invest in costly preventive activities 
to avoid the occurrences of errors. Second, given the occurrence of an error, they decide on whether to 
report about an incidence or not. Two types of penalties (fines) are introduced for each error category 
(adverse events, AE, and near misses, NM).
18 First, a penalty,  i t , in the following denoted as the 
accountability penalty, is imposed if the physician is held liable for a medical error, where 
,. iA E N M =
19 This penalty is the same independent of how the incident was revealed to the regulator. 
                                                           
14 This assumption implies that the expected liability risk is negatively correlated to the care level. There is 
nothing like a due care level that ensures ex-ante with certainty that negligent errors can be avoided and that the 
provider will not be held liable. 
15 Patient compensation can be achieved by liability (malpractice systems) or by no-fault systems (administrative 
systems). 
16 The issue of medical errors introduce additional dimensions since the objective of regulation represents two 
social externalities – patient injuries (a negative one) and learning benefits (a positive one). 
17 The observed tendency to blame individuals, rather than placing responsibility on institutions, is challenged in 
several works (see Reason, 2000 and Reinertsen, 2000). This work is not concerned with what level to put the 
blame. In the text we denote the responsible agent(s) as physicians.    
18 Here we follow the literature on optimal deterrence by treating fines as costless transfers (redistributed). 
19 In US malpractice law near misses can not be litigated.    7
Second, the regulator may impose a penalty,  i s (non-report penalty), for those who fail to report about 
an incidence and are detected, where  ,. iA E N M =  Consequently, an individual choosing not to self-
report, given error category i, but is detected and held liable, is penalised by  ii ts + , while a self-
reporting individual being held liable faces the penalty  i t , only.
20 
  In the following p(e) denotes the probability of an error to occur, where e is expenditures 
invested in reducing this probability (preventive effort) and p(e) is continuous, twice differentiable, 
and a strictly decreasing function in effort; 
'' ' 0, 0 ee e pp < > . Hence, effort is here assumed to influence 
the probability of errors only, and not the distribution of outcomes.
21 The value of e is unobservable 
(or not verifiable) for the regulator. At the end of the first period, for a given e, physicians observe 
privately whether an error has occurred or not. Given an incidence, physicians face two possible 
options - whether to report about the incidence to the regulator (self-report), or to lie low (non-report), 
but risk being discovered by the patient, the patient family, colleagues, or medical audits. The 
occurrence of an error is private information for physicians and the incident itself provides them with 
information on what category of error that has occurred. The two error categories, adverse events and 
near misses, differ with respect to social (patient) costs implications; AE D and NM D , where 
0 AE NM DD >= . These costs include patient injury and discomfort as well as treatment costs due to 
rehabilitation, increased hospital stay and additional medical expenses. A unique relationship is 
assumed between the error category (level of damage,  i D ) and the exogenous probability of detection, 
i q , if choosing not to report, where 
AE NM qq > .
22 Errors with outcomes that inflict much discomfort for 
the patient are more difficult to hide from the regulator. For each error category two states are possible 
([H]igh and [L]ow) each described by a certain liability probability;  , ij r  where  , iA E N M = and 
                                                           
20 It follows from this specification that providers can be held liable for not reporting even if not held liable for 
an error. Even more flexible penalty regimes could be introduced e.g. by allowing penalties to depend on social 
costs.   
21 The noisy negligence rule implies that the occurrences of errors are accidental (fallible humans). An additional 
justification for such a specification is contractual (transaction) costs.   
22 The detection probability points to a market failure (imperfect monitoring). This probability is here exogenous 
and costless since a share of errors always becomes common knowledge through patient complaints and reports.   8
, j HL = .
23 Thus four error types may occur differing w.r.t the probability of being held liable.
24 Let 
β  and 1 β −  be the share of adverse events and near misses, respectively, while ij v is the share of 




v ≤ ∑  and where  i q ,β , () p e , and  ij v are 
common knowledge. 
  It is assumed that both modes of ex-post behaviour (reporting or the failure to report) involve 
penalties beyond those following from formal penalties in terms of feelings of shame and guilt. Such 
penalties, in the following denoted as informal ones, are allowed to vary across error types. Given the 
decision to self-report, a cost  ij b (shame parameter) is introduced, which may reflect i) patient and 
patient family anger, ii) social condemnation and the feeling of being singled out, exposed and one’s 
competence questioned, and iii) possible effects on future career and earning possibilities due to 
reputation losses.
25,26 For physicians who decide to keep silent about errors, a parameter ij a is 
introduced (a guilt-parameter) to reflect the fear of being discovered as well as the moral costs that 
goes with the violation of the ethical responsibility to inform both patients and the regulator about 
error episodes. A high value of  ij a is likely in medical cultures with a strong professional ethics. Both 
parameters ( ij b and  ij a ) may also include the physicians’ concern for the patient (feelings of guilt and 
remorse) given the occurrence of an error.  
  The second period decision (ex-post) is first studied. At this stage of the game, they know 
whether an error has occurred, and if so, which particular type they are confronted with. The expected 
penalties, given the occurrence of an error of type ij, are;  
(1 )0 ij ij ij i ij ij ij i SR b r t r b r t =+ + − =+    w h e r e  , = iA E N M  and  , = j HL        (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
This probability may of course be increased by investing resources in medical reviews but this measure is not 
considered in this analysis.  
23 Liability probabilities are potential policy instruments, being influenced by the definition of due care 
(strictness of the negligence rule) and resources invested in review processes, but are here treated as exogenous 
variables.  
24 Errors can not always be attributed to negligence, carelessness or incompetence since being unpreventable 
(normal risks) or because of scientific, clinical or legal uncertainties.  
25 Leape and Berwick (2000) describes medical cultures as cultures of shame, where the mechanism of 
“shaming, naming and blaming” acts as a barrier to a free sharing of information. See also Rosenthal (1995).     9
[( )( 1 ) 0 ] ( ) ij ij i ij i i ij ij i ij i i NR a q r t s r a q r t s =+ ++ − =+ +where  , = iA E N M  and  , = j HL        (2) 
where  ij SR denotes the expected penalty if an error of typeij is reported to the regulator, while  ij NR is 
the expected penalty if the physician fails to report the same incident. It is observed from (1) that the 
expected self-report penalty is the sum of the shame parameter and the expected accountability penalty 
(the product of the actual probability of being held liable, ij r , and the accountability penalty itself,  i t ). 
The expected non-report penalty (see 2) is the sum of three terms; the parameter reflecting guilt, the 
expected penalty associated with the act of non-reporting, and the expected penalty associated with 
being held liable for the occurrence of a medical error (negligent behaviour). Note that the self-report 
penalty, ij SR , depends only on the accountability penalty,  i t , while ij NR  is a function of both formal 
penalties ( i t  and  i s ).   
  The condition that ensures that physicians self-report, given the occurrence of an error of type 
ij, is; 
  () ( 1 ) ij ij ij ij i ij i i ij i ij ij i i ij i i S R N R b rt a q s rt b a qs rt q ≤⇒ + ≤ ++ ⇒ − ≤ + −
          (3)
 
It follows from (3) that the moral cost differential, ij ij ij mba ≡ − , defined as the “shame” associated 
with self-reporting subtracted the “guilt” that goes with lying low, has an important effect on reporting 
incentives. Given a shame-dominated culture, 0 ij m > , a high non-report penalty ( i s ) and a low 
accountability penalty ( i t ), are needed to induce health care workers to self-report.  
  The first-period decision (ex-ante), where physicians decide on preventable activities 
(precautionary care), and before knowing whether an error will occur, and if so what type, follows 
from;  
() ( , , , ) ,
pa
AE NM AE NM e Min C e p e R t t s s =+
                             (4)
 
where       { } ,, ,
,
(, , , ) m i n ; [ ]
a
AE NM AE NM ij i j i j i i j i i i
ij
Rt t s s v b r ta r t s q =+ + + ∑        
                                                                                                                                                                                     
26 Sexton, Thomas and Helmreich (2000) reports that more than half of the intensive care staff finds it difficult to 
discuss mistakes because of personal reputation and possible disciplinary actions.    10
Physicians are assumed to minimise the sum of preventive costs,e, and the product of the probability 
and the expected (ex-ante) penalty. The outcome, given the non-occurrence of an error, with 
probability 1( ) p e −  is zero.  
  In order to derive the first-best penalty scheme, the optimal solution needs to be defined. The 
optimal level of effort is determined by the following expression;
27  




eC e p e D β ≡= +                  ( 5 )  
It is now straightforward to show that optimal deterrence (optimal preventive effort), 
* e , is the level 
that equates the marginal increase in effort costs with the marginal expected decline in social costs. 
Furthermore, the quality of error information is assumed the same for both error types. In addition, 
information quality is independent on the way errors become common knowledge – whether self-
reported or detected. In both cases the quality of information is here normalised to 1, which implies 
that the expected quality of information is 1 and  i q , for self-reported and non-reported errors, 
respectively.
28 Since the regulator is indifferent to the information source, she is always better off in 
expectancy terms, given self-reporting behaviour.
29 The above discussion makes evident why the first–
best solution is one for which all physicians self-report and where each of them invest 
* e into 
preventive effort.  
  Optimal deterrence is now achieved by inducing the decision-maker to internalize all societal 





(, , , ) [ ]
a
AE S R A E N M A E N M i j ij iji
ij
DR t t s s v b r t β == + ∑                     (6) 
                                                           
27 A possible extension would be to count moral costs ( ij b and  ij a ) as social ones. However, it is not obvious that 
e.g. the fear of being detected and discomfort associated with non-compliance to law, should be included. 
28 In this paper, it is not focused at how to analyse and use information in order to translate negative results into 
useful information. A rather simple approach is chosen where the number of collected reports linearly increases 
the quantity and value of information, hence reducing the future problem medical errors.  
29 The benefits associated with error information (e.g. in terms of a lower future frequency of errors) are not 
explicitly integrated into (7) for ethical reasons. The possibility for an optimal policy to allow for a lenient 
deterrence level (a high probability for errors) in order to gain additional error information is ruled out 
(lexicographic preferences).  




v = ∑ .   11
where
** (, , , )
a
SR AE NM AE NM Rtt ss is the expected (ex-ante) penalty given the existence of non-reporting 









= ,                                 (7) 
where         
,, NM j NM j
j
vr η =∑ , 
,, AE j AE j
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bv b =∑ . 
η and δ are the expected probabilities of being held liable for a near miss and an adverse event, 
respectively whileb is expected moral costs (shame) being associated with self-reporting behaviour. 
All combinations of 
AE t and 
NM t that simultaneously fulfil (7) represent a menu of optimal penalty 
levels. It is observed that a higher value of 
NM t yields a lower value of 
AE t and that each penalty can be 
set equal to zero without abstaining from the possibility to induce first-best effort. Consider now the 
case for 0
NM t =  and expected social error costs,
AE D β , exceeding expected “shame”, b , which yields 
an optimal value of  AE t being positive. If, on the other hand, AE Db β < , defensive medicine (over-
deterrence) is experienced, and AE t must now be negative to get the incentives right. It also follows that 
AE t decreases with the expected liability probability for adverse events (δ ). Note that detection 
probabilities have no effect on the optimal penalty levels, since the risk of being detected matters for 
those who fail to report, only. A complete or partly inclusion of physician moral costs ( ij b and  ij a ) as 
social ones would change (7). The optimal penalty levels would now be higher for the same parameter 
values, since the expected social costs associated with errors are higher given such an assumption.       
  The next step is to determine the optimal levels of the non-report penalties so that self-
reporting behaviour is induced irrespective of error type. To solve this problem we first define the 
level of  ij s  that makes the optimal self-report rule (see 3) binding for each error type. This procedure 
provides us with the following four critical levels;  
*(1 ) +−
=






                            ( 8 )    12
where ij s is the lowest possible value s can attain, for error type ij, and still be able to induce self-















                             (9) 
The expressions in (9) say that the optimal non-report penalty for each error category (AE and NM) is 
to be higher (or equal to) than the highest critical level for sij defined by (8) for each error category.   
  In order to undertake a complete ranking of the critical levels defined in (8) we impose the 
following assumptions;  
,,,, , , iH iH iH iL iL iL mbab am =−≥−=                      ( 1 0 )  
By using (10) and  ,, AE H AE L rr >  and  ,, NM H NM L rr > , the following ranking matters;   
,, >
iH iL ss                                       (11) 
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The optimal level in (12) ensures that adverse events with a high liability probability are self-reported, 
while (13) yields the same outcome for near misses. The same two penalty levels also induce self-
reporting for errors with a low liability probability, since for any level of tands , self-reporting 
incentives are most significant for such errors.  If the conditions in (12) and (13) are binding and both 
accountability penalties described in (7) are positive, it follows that 
*
i s  is strictly increasing with the 
liability probability ( ij r ) and the importance of shame relative to guilt (m ), while 
*
i s is strictly 
decreasing with the detection probability ( i q ).  
  The penalty scheme described by (7), (12), and (13) is the optimal one. Now both ex-ante and 
ex-post incentives are socially correct. The same three equations make evident the interdependency   13
that exists between accountability and non-report penalties. A higher accountability penalty for any 
error category makes it necessary to adjust upwards the non-report penalty for the same error category.  
 
2.   The IOM policy proposal.  
The IOM policy proposal will now be evaluated. This proposal suggests mandatory reporting for 
adverse medical events (punitive environment) and voluntary reporting (non-punitive) for near misses. 
Unfortunately, it is not perfectly clear from the report what is actually meant by mandatory reporting 
systems. In particular, whether mandatory reporting includes the possibility of penalising individuals 
for not reporting errors, hence two possibilities are discussed below.
31  
Case I)  AE t  and  AE s  
Case II)     AE t   
It follows that penalties targeted at near misses are unavailable in both cases since voluntary reporting 
implies the non-existence of any formal penalties.
32 The two cases differ, however, for adverse events. 
In Case II, mandatory reporting includes the possibility of imposing an accountability penalty, while in 
Case I mandatory reporting is interpreted as a regime that may impose non-report penalties for adverse 
events as well.
33  
  First case I is considered. By imposing the above conditions onto the optimal penalty scheme 
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          (15) 
0
NM NM ts ==                   ( 1 6 )  
                                                           
31 See chapter 5 and 6 in IOM (2000) and Barach and Small (2000). 
32 This interpretation seems to be in accordance with the description given by IOM (see section 1). 
33 We do not consider various costs being associated with operating error reporting systems. Such costs may be 
considerable and will most probably differ across reporting systems.       14
The penalty level in (14) yields optimal deterrence when all errors are self-reported, hence ex-ante 
incentives can be socially correct even when  NM t is unavailable. The optimal non-report penalty in (15) 
ensures that all adverse events are self-reported. However, as concerns near misses there is no 
available instrument to influence self-reporting incentives hence the reporting decision will depend on 
model parameters. The optimal self-report rule for near misses (see 3) in Case I becomes;    
,, , 0
NM j NM j NM j ba m ≤⇒ ≤ ,             ( 1 7 )  
hence near misses will be self-reported in medical cultures with a strong professional ethics (guilt-
dominated cultures), consequently first-best is unattainable in shame-dominated cultures (
, 0
NM j m > ).  
  Now, case II is considered. By imposing the relevant conditions for this case onto (7), (12) and 
(13), (14) remains unchanged while (15) now is equal to zero. As before, (14) defines optimal 
deterrence, when all errors are self-reported. The conclusions arrived at in Case I still prevail for Case 
II as concerns reporting incentives for near misses. However, the absence of  AE s makes it necessary to 
investigate self-reporting incentives for adverse events. The optimal self-report rule for adverse events, 
for case II, is;  
**
,, , , AEj A EjA E A Ej A EA EjA E br t aq r t +< +
    
  
     ( 1 8 )
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 −−  ≤− =               ( 1 9 )  
Given a positive value of the accountability penalty, 0
AE Db β − > , it is observed from (19) that strong 
professional ethics (a guilt-dominated culture; 
, 0
NM j m ≤ ) is not sufficient to ensure self-reporting of 
adverse events. This conclusion follows because of  , (1 ) 0 AE j AE rq − <  which measures the difference in 
the expected penalty across the two modes of behaviour (non-reporting and reporting). In order to 
induce self-reporting of adverse events, the moral costs differential ( , AE j m ) must now be negative. 
Hence, a guilt-dominated culture is not sufficient to ensure self-reporting of all adverse events. It is 
also observed that a low detection probability for adverse events, a high liability probability, and a 
high accountability penalty, make self-reporting less likely.    15
  In case I it is shown that the presence of a non-report for adverse events ensures that such 
errors become self-reported while near misses become self-reported only if medical cultures have a 
strong professional ethics (guilt-dominated culture). The presence of the same culture, however, is not 
sufficient to induce the first-best when both non-report penalties are unavailable as regulatory 
instruments (Case II). This result follows from the relationship between the optimal accountability 
penalty and the optimal non-report penalty (see 3). An adverse event accountability penalty that 
induces optimal deterrence, acts on the same time as a disincentive for self-reporting adverse events. 
Consequently, the ability to reach the first-best in Case II is reduced with the size of the accountability 
penalty (degree of deterrence). This property is absent for medical near misses, both in Case I and II, 
since a near miss accountability penalty is not present. A final observation is that the presence of one 
accountability penalty, only, is sufficient to create the socially correct ex-ante incentives (deterrence). 
However, an accountability penalty for each error category (adverse events and near misses) 
introduces additional flexibility, since the regulator now can choose from a menu of penalty levels that 
all induce the first-best effort level.  
 
3.  Conclusion 
The economic literature on error prevention is primarily concerned with malpractice systems (see e.g. 
Simon, 1982 and Danzon, 2000) with a focus on optimal insurance, precautionary care (deterrence) 
and patient compensation. The medical literature, on the other hand, is increasingly concerned with 
reporting incentives and the learning potential from knowing about errors (adverse events as well as 
near misses). The analytical model presented here represents a structured way of thinking about error 
prevention and reporting incentives and can be used to pre-evaluate the effectiveness of various 
proposed incentive systems. It is shown that penalty regimes that held decision-makers liable for the 
occurrences of negligent adverse events (precautionary care) and the non-reporting of both error 
categories can induce the first-best solution.  
  A contingent error reporting system, as suggested by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), that 
held medical decision-makers responsible for adverse events only, is not an optimal one. This scheme 
is able to address ex-ante incentives (optimal deterrence), but will not ensure that all errors, if they   16
occur, become common knowledge (self-reported). Near misses become self-reported only if the 
feeling of shame that goes with self-reporting is less than the guilt associated with keeping near misses 
a secret (guilt-dominated culture). However, the same culture is not able to ensure the self-reporting of 
adverse events. Evidence on medical errors confirms that errors are significantly underreported, which 
suggests “shame-dominated” cultures in health care. Consequently, non-report penalties seem crucial 
for being able to learn from error incidents in order to reduce the future adverse event frequencies.  
  A problem with the IOM report is that the proposal is not discussed in relation to current 
institutions e.g. it remains unclear whether the proposed reform is to replace or be integrated into 
malpractice systems. Anyway, this analysis shed light on the efficiency properties of malpractice 
systems for which near misses liability and reporting incentives are ignored but where decision-
makers are only partly held liable for adverse events since being shielded from financial risks due to 
liability insurances. Hence, the adverse event accountability penalty is Case II can be interpreted as the 
provider liability risk (co-insurance rates, time costs and possible reputation effects). The above 
discussion shows that absent near miss liability does not represent a social problem as concerns 
deterrence incentives since they can be addressed by adverse event liability. However, the liability risk 
in malpractice systems is not generally controlled by the regulator, and interventions in liability 
insurance markets are mainly done to control premiums and such reforms are not expected to change 
deterrence incentives since experience-rated contracts are rare in malpractice systems (Sloan, 1990). 
Several studies confirm the practicing of defensive medicine (over-deterrence) as well as 
underreporting of adverse events. This analysis points to significant informal costs (blame and guilt), 
high liability probabilities, and the absence of non-reporting penalties as possible explanations. 
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